Greek term generally translated as <<lack of command of oneself>>. The
 cause of akrasia is not ignorance, but passion, anger or desire and it
 comes with a partial knowledge of what would be right to do. Akrasia
 leads an agent to perform a bad action, even though he knows it is bad.
 In other terms, an agent might know that doing A is better that doing
 B, nevertheless she will rather do B instead of A. This situation is
 also known as weakness of the will.
 Plato considers akrasia one of the reasons of shortage of wisdom
 (Sofrosune), and cause of intemperance (akolasia).
 According to Aristotele, an akratic man "rebels against reasoning" and
 "if he knows that he does bad actions, he does the all the same,
 because of passion" (Ethics to Nicomaco 1145b, 10-20).

Bibliography: Platon, Laws, 869a, 334b, 886a, 908c, 934a, 863b, 864b; Aristotele, Ethics to Nicomaco 1145b, 10-20; 1147a 35-1147b; 1147a 1 e segg.; Great Ethics, 1201b, 31 e segg. A.W.H. Adkins: Merit and Responsibility. A Study in Greek Values, Oxford, 1960.